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OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA:  
CAN THE LANDING FORCE SURVIVE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Long lines of operation will pose unique and difficult security problems for the OMFTS force. General Winfield Scott, during his Vera Cruz campaign, operated successfully over long lines of operation. Conversely, Field Marshal Montgomery, during Operation Market Garden, failed to adequately mitigate the risks associated with long lines of operation with disastrous results. The lessons learned from comparing and contrasting these two operations are profound yet critical for those who will both shape and employ the future OMFTS force.

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## Introduction

In December 1995, the United States Marine Corps introduced Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) as its future warfighting concept. The OMFTS concept was developed as an extension of the Navy White Papers *From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea* that emphasized the increasing importance that the world's littoral regions would play in shaping world events. According to its authors, OMFTS merely applied the tenets of U.S. Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine to littoral warfare; however, with respect to the conduct of amphibious operations, OMFTS presents a bold and radically different approach. The cornerstone of OMFTS is Ship to Objective Maneuver\* (STOM), which maintains that future naval expeditionary forces will project combat power from over the horizon to inland operational objectives without establishing a traditional beachhead to serve as a base of operation. Although there are numerous challenges associated with the aforementioned concept, this work will focus on the long lines of operation that will be inherent to OMFTS operations. Specifically this paper will argue that OMFTS, as a result of its inherent long lines of operation violates, to a point of detriment, the Principle of War: Security. This work will begin by examining the tenets of OMFTS. Then it will examine two historical examples, through an OMFTS prism, where forces operated over long lines of operation. From those examples, it will attempt to reveal the conditions and considerations that made those operations either successful or unsuccessful. Finally, it will recommend how those conditions and considerations may guide future operational leaders in the prudent use of an OMFTS force. Security has come to mean many things to many people; therefore, a brief digression to discuss its meaning in the context of this paper is in order.

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\* In 1997 the Marine Corps introduced STOM, which began the process of bringing the operational concept, OMFTS, from the theoretical to the practical. Henceforth, this paper will examine both OMFTS and STOM as one seamless concept and will differentiate between the two only when necessity dictates.

## Security

Naval War College Professor Milan Vego wrote, "Security is the least understood of all principles of war."<sup>1</sup> Joint Publication 3-0 tells us, "Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise."<sup>2</sup> Security is paramount to mission accomplishment at both the tactical and operational levels of war and failure to adequately address it has led to many battlefield disasters over the history of warfare. But given the speed of modern communications and the U.S. public's apparent casualty averse nature, the modern commander who acts imprudently may not only jeopardize the success of the military operation at hand but may inadvertently expose the U.S. strategic center of gravity to enemy exploitation. The U.S. withdrawal of its forces from Somalia following the graphically publicized ambush of the Rangers in Mogadishu highlights this potentiality. What is OMFTS and are its risks inherently greater than traditional amphibious operations?

### **Security and the OMFTS Force**

The Marine Corps developed OMFTS because of perceived changes in the operational environment, a new series of threats and emerging technology that will enhance both friendly and enemy capabilities. With these changes in mind, the framers of OMFTS adopted several principles that will guide the future development and employment of the OMFTS force. To understand OMFTS and to form an analytical foundation we will examine the OMFTS principles emphasizing their strengths and weaknesses with respect to operational security. The OMFTS principle, objective, will be discussed first.

*Marine Corps Reference Publication 0-1* states, "The heart of Operational Maneuver From the Sea is the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level, a bold bid for victory that aims at exploiting a significant enemy weakness in order to deal a decisive blow."

Furthermore it states, "...operational maneuver should be directed against an enemy center of gravity---something that is *essential* to the enemy's ability to effectively continue the struggle."<sup>3</sup> At first glance, the preceding quotes seem to offer little for critical analysis.

OMFTS is clearly on solid ground where it invokes boldness, an indispensable attribute of successful commanders throughout the ages. Indeed Clausewitz dedicated an entire chapter to boldness and wrote that, "...a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable."<sup>4</sup>

The idea that operational maneuver should be directed against the enemy's center of gravity and should aim at exploiting an enemy weakness is also a concept firmly grounded in historical military convention. However, unlike most historical examples, the OMFTS force's success and possibly its survival will depend upon the commander's ability to correctly ascertain the enemy's center of gravity and his ability to locate or create an exploitable weakness that permits access thereunto. It is here that the operational commander must answer some tough questions with respect to the utility of the OMFTS force. First, is the operational objective or center of gravity within the reach of a sea-based force? Second, does the OMFTS force possess enough combat power to achieve its objective? Third, is the risk associated with a "bold bid for victory" commensurate with the potential gain? The answers to some of these questions lie in the remaining explanation of the OMFTS principles.

The OMFTS force will treat the sea as maneuver space. "For the force that controls it, the sea is both a protective barrier and highway of unparalleled mobility."<sup>5</sup> While emerging technology will enhance the U.S. maritime force's ability to exploit the sea as maneuver space, this paper will focus upon the OMFTS force from the coastline to the objective. Once ashore, the OMFTS force will lose many of the advantages that the sea has provided. The authors of the OMFTS concept envision the force surviving and succeeding in the following

manner. The force will begin by "Turning the enemy's vulnerable flank, or exploiting gaps in his positions, the landing force thrusts combat units by air and surface deeply into his defensive array."<sup>6</sup> It requires no unique intuition to realize that the deeper the OMFTS force penetrates enemy territory the longer its lines of operations become and the longer a force's lines of operation become the more vulnerable it is. In essence, OMFTS proposes to exchange the vulnerabilities of a shore base of operation, or beachhead, for the vulnerabilities inherent in long lines of operation. In order to tip the balance in favor of the OMFTS force, the commander of the OMFTS force will project combat power from over the horizon with such speed and at such a pace that he denies the enemy reaction time and forces the enemy to "...defend a vast area against our sea borne mobility and deep power projection" which will "...render most of his force irrelevant."<sup>7</sup> In order for the preceding vignette to be realized, the OMFTS force will be heavily dependent upon real time, accurate intelligence and will use deception and or specific actions to recognize or create exploitable gaps in the enemy's defenses. Additionally, the OMFTS force must possess the command and control architecture to disseminate intelligence and orders quickly enough to allow the maneuver elements to exploit it. While such intelligence and command and control capabilities present significant challenges, the remainder of this paper will work on the premise that the OMFTS force has located, cleared, and penetrated gaps in the enemy's defense and is operating 50 or more miles inland.

In traditional amphibious operations, the force operating ashore projected combat power from a relatively secure beachhead. The beachhead not only provided a robust logistics stockpile, but also shortened the maneuver force's lines of operation. The beachhead also placed the landing force in a tactically central position from where it could reinforce and

resupply internally as it moved inland. The OMFTS force, on the contrary and by design, will normally operate on exterior lines. OMFTS trades the security inherent to internal lines of operation for the increased potential for surprise and maneuver realized by a force operating on external lines. Is the OMFTS force operating on long lines of operation too vulnerable, or can it through speed, superior intelligence, and technical superiority survive once its forces come ashore? If it can, are there any fundamental truths or parameters associated with such operations? The U.S. Vera Cruz campaign may provide some insight.

### **Winfield Scott, Vera Cruz and Mexico City**

In the fall of 1846 President James K. Polk realized that his current strategy, designed to force the Mexican government to agree to the U.S. annexation of Texas, was not working. Moreover, the president was displeased with Major General Zachary Taylor's indecisive military campaign in the western U.S.<sup>8</sup> In September, the Mexican government had rejected a U.S. peace offer and it had become evident that the U.S. would have to exert additional military pressure upon the Mexican government. Polk and his closest advisors began to consider the merits of sending a force to seize Vera Cruz and to march from there to Mexico City. In October, Major General Winfield Scott submitted a planning paper to the president that outlined the requirements for such an operation. Scott's paper, which argued that to capture Vera Cruz without marching on to the capital would be meaningless, combined with further supporting arguments from Polk's cabinet convinced the president to shift the main effort from Taylor in the west to Vera Cruz. Polk also made the prudent decision to appoint Scott as the commander of the expedition.<sup>9</sup>

Polk learned from Taylor's ineffective campaign that chasing Mexican forces throughout northern Mexico would not force the Mexican leadership to agree to our peace



terms. Scott's mission was to seize Vera Cruz, to march inland to Mexico City, and to compel the Mexican government to accept U.S. peace terms. The operation was definitely aimed at the enemy's center of gravity. Scott's concept of operation, at least at the outset, bore little resemblance to an OMFTS operation. In fact, it began almost as model 20<sup>th</sup> century styled amphibious operation. Scott's initial plan was to capture Vera Cruz, to establish a base of operation and to proceed inland, along secure lines of communication to Mexico City. When Scott's amphibious force approached Vera Cruz, it faced the ominous presence of Fort San Juan De Ulua that guarded the seaward approaches to Vera Cruz. Scott avoided the enemy's strength by using the sea as maneuver space. On 10 March 1847, Scott and his forces landed unopposed south of Vera Cruz. Once ashore, and over the protests of many of his more impetuous subordinate commanders, he placed the city under siege rather than attack it head on, which preserved his limited combat power for the upcoming march to the capital.<sup>10</sup> On 27 March, Vera Cruz surrendered and by 8 April, he had moved his forces 74 miles inland to the town of Jalapa.<sup>11</sup>

Scott halted at Jalapa until 7 August. While at Jalapa several problems with his initial concept of operations became evident. First was his lack of transport. When he and his expedition set out from the U.S., they were significantly short of mules and wagons. Although they attempted to locally procure the needed draft animals, they were unable to gather enough of them from the Mexican countryside.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, Scott's resupply problems were not limited to transport. As he moved inland, his lines of communication became a major security problem. Guerilla forces operated along his main supply route and wreaked havoc upon his resupply effort. The constant threat to his resupply efforts forced him to station garrisons along his line of communication which consumed indispensable

combat forces.<sup>13</sup> Scott then made the bold decision to sever his supply lines with Vera Cruz and to proceed towards Mexico City with only his combat trains and those provisions that he could reap from the countryside. On 7 August Scott and his three divisions departed Jalapa for Mexico City. Many military critics throughout the world, when they heard of Scott's decision, lamented that he was surely lost and that failure was certain now that he was isolated from his base of operation.<sup>14</sup> But all was not lost, Scott skillfully applied the tenets of maneuver warfare and demonstrated that a force could operate deep within enemy territory, over long lines of operation and not only survive, but defeat a determined enemy.

As was mentioned earlier, Scott's force satisfied the first tenet of OMFTS that demands that the objective be operational and directed at the enemy's center of gravity. His decision to sever his lines of communication most certainly qualifies as a "bold bid for victory" as advocated by the authors of the OMFTS concept. Another key OMFTS tenet involves the security and surprise gained by using the sea as maneuver space. While Scott did maneuver around the strongly defended fort at Vera Cruz and landed upon an undefended beach, he and his force lacked the technology to use the sea as maneuver space to the extent advocated by OMFTS. However, once ashore Scott's operations closely paralleled the tenets of OMFTS and maneuver warfare. The similarities were particularly evident in his extensive intelligence gathering efforts and his tactical maneuver, which consistently located and exploited gaps in the enemy's defenses.

Early in the campaign, while Scott and his force were garrisoned at Jalapa, Colonel Allen Hitchcock created a network of spies, informers, guides, and couriers amongst the indigenous population.<sup>15</sup> Throughout the operation, this network supplied Scott with valuable human intelligence and insight on the enemy, the local population, and the peculiarities of the

local area of operation. In addition to his human intelligence network, Scott extensively used aggressive reconnaissance to locate the enemy, to find assailable flanks, and to ensure that his forces were, as much as was practicable, always moving along an unexpected avenue of approach. Scott also understood the value of deception. When Scott began his march to Mexico City, he left one division a day's march behind. Their mission was to threaten and to deceive the enemy as long as practicable as to the actual route and time of departure of the main body.<sup>16</sup> At the battle of Contrera two of Scott's divisions, numbering approximately 4,500, defeated an entrenched Mexican force of 7,000. The battle was characterized by Scott's force fixing the defenders, aggressively reconnoitering and locating gaps in the enemy defensive array, and by maneuvering forces under the cover of rain and darkness and over difficult terrain into the enemy's rear. The American force's bold maneuvers unnerved the defenders, unhinged the defense and opened the road to Mexico City.<sup>17</sup>

Scott's Vera Cruz campaign proved that a sizeable combat force could operate over long lines of operation, deep within enemy territory and maintain the security necessary to ensure freedom of action. Scott's recipe for success was strikingly similar to the tenets of OMFTS. The force pursued an operational, arguably a strategic, objective, which justified the inherently risky operation. Scott used, as much as his technology would permit, the sea as maneuver space by choosing an undefended beach for his amphibious landing. Scott developed a highly effective human intelligence network that served him well throughout the campaign. On the tactical level, Scott's forces, in all but one occasion, thoroughly reconnoitered both the enemy disposition and all possible avenues of approach into his objectives. The knowledge gained from these reconnaissance efforts allowed him to maintain freedom of action, to strike against enemy weaknesses and to avoid engaging in costly battles

of attrition. For instance, Scott was able to divide his forces and to march them over multiple routes, but he always kept them within one day's march of one another. This technique helped him locate favorable routes, confuse the enemy as to his true intentions, and maintain the ability to reinforce any element within one day's time. Scott's six-month campaign missed the mark with respect to the overwhelming tempo and momentum that will characterize OMFTS operations. However, when one factors the available technology of the period, and views the high tempo that Scott created at the tactical level, it is certainly arguable that he maintained as much momentum as possible. Scott's success proved that security could be maintained over long lines of operation. Furthermore, he ensured the security of his force by adeptly using the OMFTS principals of intelligence, maneuver, and deception to pit his strength against the enemy's weakness. In summary, the Vera Cruz operation proved that a force could successfully operate over long lines and both survive and succeed. But the Allies attempted a similar operation during World War II, and the outcome was very different.

### **Market Garden**

In the late summer of 1944, the Allies were amassing logistics for an attack into the German heartland. During the operational pause between the landings at Normandy and the commencement of the final allied offensive into Germany, a disagreement in strategy emerged between General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery. Eisenhower's plan favored sequentially seizing and opening the Antwerp Port and driving towards the German heartland on a wide allied front. Montgomery, on the other hand, believed that one bold "...full-blooded thrust to Berlin..."<sup>18</sup> was the surest and quickest way to defeat what he assessed was a dazed and significantly weakened German army.

Montgomery initially attempted to convince Eisenhower to make him the main effort and to give him virtually all of the Allies' scarce materiel and supplies. Eisenhower refused, but Montgomery pressed the issue and developed a second plan. Montgomery's second plan called for a three-division Allied airborne (launched from bases in Britain) seizure of three successive bridges through Holland that terminated at Arnhem's bridge over the Rhine River. The airborne operation was code named Market. Simultaneous with the airborne assault, a corps sized armor and infantry force would fight through approximately 64 miles of German resistance to link-up with and to relieve the airborne elements. The ground portion was code named Garden. Market Garden's objective was to secure a bridgehead across the Rhine River in order to encircle the German forces in the Ruhr and to proceed to Berlin.<sup>19</sup>

OMFTS demands that its objective be operational and aimed at the enemy's center of gravity. In retrospect, it is difficult to see how Market Garden met either of these criteria. If Market Garden had been successful, it would have placed the British XXX Corps approximately 90 miles inside Holland at the end of a long and dry line of communication.\* It seems likely that, due to the shortage of supplies, Montgomery's Second Army would have surpassed its culminating point had Market Garden been successful. Moreover, if Eisenhower had truly believed that the Arnhem area was destined to serve as a future base of operation, it seems that he would have weighted the effort more heavily and would have redeployed other allied forces to exploit the breakthrough. Eisenhower, in spite of the dubious payoff that Market Garden offered and the high risk it entailed, approved the operation. A decision that author and historian Stephen Ambrose characterized as "...his worst error of the war."<sup>20</sup>

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\* When the Allies executed Market Garden, the approaches to the port of Antwerp were still under German control. German control of Antwerp forced the Allies to draw the bulk of their supplies over the beaches.

Market Garden was a high-risk operation that offered a minimal reward, but that wasn't why it failed. When forces operate over long lines of operation, it is imperative for their security that they have a clear picture of the enemy within the area of operations. When Montgomery conceived Market Garden, he believed the Germans were a disorganized and severely weakened force. But days before the operation began, the intelligence picture indicated otherwise. Information gained from Dutch Resistance, Ultra deciphering of German radio transmissions, and German POWs began to indicate that there was a build-up of German armored units\* in and around Arnhem.<sup>21</sup> Major General R.E. Urquhart, whose British First Airborne Division was tasked with seizing the bridge at Arnhem, became concerned and requested aerial photography of the area. The aerial photos revealed both Mark III and Mark IV tanks near Arnhem. Urquhart discussed the presence of German armor and expressed his concerns to his boss, Lieutenant General F.A.M. Browning. Unfortunately, Browning summarily dismissed Urquhart and placed him on sick leave.<sup>22</sup> Two days before Market Garden began, Eisenhower informed Montgomery that there were two German divisions refitting in the Arnhem area, but Montgomery refused to cancel the operation and, Eisenhower chose not to overrule him.<sup>23</sup> Market Garden had gained such momentum that even a significant change in the enemy situation would not suffice to cancel it. While one can certainly appreciate the momentum that an operation this large must have generated and how difficult it would have been to terminate, the fact that little to no adjustments to the plan were made to mitigate the risks created by the presence of the two German divisions is inconceivable. OMFTS would demand that the landing force pit its strength against the enemy's weak points. Market Garden initially pitted allied strength against a German weak

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\* The Allies later discovered that both the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> SS Panzer Divisions were refitting near Arnhem.

point, but the Germans quickly maneuvered their forces and transformed that weakness into strength.

The presence of the two German divisions in the Arnhem area was problematic, but it may have been overcome had the allies made a few adjustments to the plan. The plan's most obvious shortcoming was the way that it piecemealed combat power into the objective area. Montgomery tasked the British First Airborne Division with securing and holding the deepest objective, but it was only one of three airborne divisions participating in the operation. Despite being tasked with performing the most risky portion of Market Garden, the British First Airborne Division was forced to jump into its objective area in three lifts over three days while the U.S. 82<sup>nd</sup> and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Divisions would be dropped over one and two days respectively. Urquhart again protested, but Browning explained that the three bridges had to be taken sequentially and if either the 82<sup>nd</sup> or the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Divisions were unsuccessful the British would stand no chance of being relieved and would be massacred.<sup>24</sup> Browning presented a cogent argument that Urquhart couldn't refute, but here the Allies compromised both the principle of surprise and the principle of mass which in turn placed the security of the First Airborne Division in serious doubt. The airborne assault genuinely surprised the Germans, but the slow build-up of allied combat power allowed them opportunity to recover from the surprise and to ultimately defeat the attack. If the allies had ended their compromises here the British First Airborne Division may have survived, but they also failed to conduct effective and decisive maneuver.

General Urquhart wanted his brigades inserted on either side of the river and as close to the bridge as possible, but due to the reported presence of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) in the area the RAF refused. There was apparently no thought given to eliminating the AAA

threat in order to facilitate the airborne drop. Urquhart dutifully accepted the fact that the air component was in charge until the troops were on the ground, which led him to compromise once again.<sup>25</sup> Urquhart and his staff accepted their lot and selected a series of drop zones six to eight miles west north west of Arnhem. Having the drop zones so far from the objective combined with the requirement to secure drop zones for three days of operation forced Urquhart to further divide his forces. Once on the ground, the airborne units lost their mobility advantage and only the Second Parachute Battalion of the First Parachute Brigade, reached the Arnhem Bridge. The Germans used the space between the drop zones and the bridge to successfully interdict the remainder of the division. OMFTS demands that the force maintain a high operational tempo that prohibits the enemy from reacting effectively. Market Garden's airborne insertion initially surprised the Germans, but the Allies' lack of tactical mobility and incremental force build-up allowed the Germans to regain the initiative and to dictate the operational tempo. In spite of the aforementioned problems, the British First Airborne Division seized and held the Arnhem Bridge for three days and three nights, but it was to no avail because the Germans had successfully interdicted the XXX Corps.

The shortcoming of Allied planning was not limited to the British First Airborne Division's portion of Market Garden. The British XXX Corps' mission was to advance from the Dutch-Belgian border to the Zuider Zee, along a 90- mile axis in order to relieve the 101<sup>st</sup>, 82<sup>nd</sup>, and First Airborne Divisions respectively. The entire Second Army would ultimately consolidate near the Zuider Zee thereby creating a base of operation for the final Allied invasion of Germany. The planners estimated that the XXX Corps would arrive at Arnhem between the second and fourth days, which required a movement of approximately 64 miles.<sup>26</sup> While this time line was reasonable at the operational level, it was unrealistic at the tactical



level. The terrain that the XXX Corps was forced to traverse was composed of flooded farmland intersected by a raised road network. The XXX Corps was depending upon its armor for its mobility, yet the armor was restricted almost exclusively to a single highway that severely limited tactical maneuver and facilitated German interdiction. The German Fifteenth Army took full advantage of the Allies' poor planning. They forced the XXX Corps to fight a series of bitter engagements and effectively delayed them and prevented them from reaching Arnhem in time to save the First Airborne Division.

### **The Lessons**

Scott's Vera Cruz Operation and Montgomery's Market Garden Operation occurred approximately 100 years apart yet they both offer valuable insight into maintaining security while conducting operations over long lines of operation. The first lesson coincides with the first OMFTS principle: the objective. President Polk faced a strategic dilemma when he decided to launch the Vera Cruz operation. He and his advisors correctly deduced that only a strike at Mexico's center of gravity, its government, would yield the desired political result. When General Winfield Scott, the operational commander, decided to cut his lines of communication he knew that he was taking a great risk, but given the potential reward of capturing the Mexican capital, the risk was warranted. Eisenhower made the decision to approve Market Garden under entirely different circumstances. When Eisenhower granted Montgomery the permission to launch Operation Market Garden the potential reward was disproportionate to the risk. If Market Garden had been successful, the allies would have possessed a 70-mile long salient that would have been very difficult to defend. The lines of communication would have been long and vulnerable. A bridgehead over the Rhine, unlike Scott's objective the Mexican capital, was neither an operational nor a strategic center of

gravity. When the future operational commander assesses the prudence of allowing an OMFTS force to seize an inland objective, he needs to ensure that the objective is of sufficient value to warrant the inherent risk.

The second lesson learned from comparing these two operations involves the second principle of OMFTS: maneuver. OMFTS advocates the use of the sea as maneuver space to enhance security, surprise, and freedom of action. Both Scott and Montgomery attempted to use operational maneuver to gain an advantage. Scott proved to be a master of combining decisive operational maneuver with equally skilled and decisive tactical maneuver. When he and his force landed at Vera Cruz, their operational maneuver placed them within reach of the Mexican center of gravity. When Santa Anna discovered that Scott was preparing to strike at Vera Cruz, he was unable or unwilling to redeploy forces to oppose the landing. Once ashore, Scott and his army consistently outmaneuvered his Mexican adversaries. Through thorough reconnaissance and skillful use of terrain, he consistently avoided enemy strengths and exploited vulnerable gaps. He pitted his strength against Mexican gaps. The net effect of Scott's masterful use of operational and tactical maneuver was that his force avoided unnecessary attrition and maintained freedom of action throughout the campaign. Operation Market Garden offers a clear contrast to the Vera Cruz Campaign. The Allies' maneuver at the operational level was conceptually sound. The airborne portion of the operation placed forces at decisive points relative to the operational objective of seizing a foothold over the Rhine River. The ground portion of the operation simply required an advance along a predetermined axis in order to link the decisive points. The principle shortcoming of Market Garden with respect to maneuver was the tactical reality associated with the operational concept. In reality, the British First Airborne Division landed incrementally over four days,

six to eight miles from its objective. The reality of the ground portion of the operation was that the XXX Corps had to attack with armor across terrain that was not conducive to the successful employment of armor. Where Scott's concept of operation and operational maneuver facilitated and complimented tactical maneuver, Montgomery's did not. What does this bode for OMFTS? When conducting operations over long lines of operations there is little room for error and details count. The operational commander cannot afford to overlook inherent weaknesses or difficulties in his plan and expect the tactical commander to "figure it out."

Intelligence is another area where there is significant contrast between the Vera Cruz operation and Operation Market Garden. Once ashore, Scott extensively used both reconnaissance and human intelligence. His network of indigenous spies provided invaluable insight on the enemy, the terrain, and the indigenous population. Throughout his march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City, he consistently and effectively employed reconnaissance elements. His aggressive reconnaissance efforts provided him invaluable information on the terrain and the enemy. The Allies, due partially to the enthusiasm and momentum surrounding Operation Market Garden, failed to aggressively reconnoiter their area of operation. Moreover, when existing intelligence assets reported disconcerting information the leaders either dismissed it or ignored it.

### **Recommendations and Conclusion**

This paper began with the premise that OMFTS, due to its inherent long lines of operation violated, to the point of detriment, the principle of war: security. Winfield Scott's successful Vera Cruz operation indicates that forces can operate over long lines of operation and maintain security. Scott unwittingly employed many of the principles

embodied in the OMFTS concept and they served him well. Montgomery, conversely violated virtually all of the OMFTS principles and the result was disastrous. Does this mean that OMFTS does not violate the principle of war: security? The answer, like most questions involving military operations, depends upon the situation. However, given the apparent U.S. public's casualty intolerance, the impact of failure is far greater today than it was for either Scott or Montgomery. Future operational and OMFTS commanders must both recognize and mitigate the risks inherent to long lines of operation. Furthermore, those commanders must fully understand the principle of war security and the elements and factors that weigh upon it. While this may seem elementary, both Eisenhower and Montgomery failed to make the connection. If they can make such a mistake, so can others.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Milan Vego, *On Operational Art (4<sup>th</sup> Draft)*, (U.S. Naval War College: Milan Vego, Sep. 1999) 205.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington D.C.: 1 February 1995), A-2.

<sup>3</sup> United States Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) Concept*, MCRP 0-1 (Washington D.C.: 1 December 1995), 7.

<sup>4</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 225.

<sup>5</sup> Paul K. Van Riper, *Ship-To-Objective Maneuver* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 25 July 1997), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> K. Jack Bauer, *The Mexican War, 1846-1848* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 233.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> John Eisenhower, *So Far From God: The US War with Mexico, 1846-1848* (New York: Random House, 1989), 256.

<sup>11</sup> G.P. Stokes, "War With Mexico! With Scott in Mexico," *Command Magazine*, no. 40, <<http://www.commandmagazine.com/Scott.htm>> [11 January 2000].

<sup>12</sup> Robert Paulus, "Pack Mules and Surf Boats: Logistics in the Mexican War," *Army Logistician*. (Nov/Dec 97): <<http://almc.army.mil/ALOG/NovDec97/MS210.htm>> [15 January 2001].

<sup>13</sup> Bauer, 269.

<sup>14</sup> Stokes.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Frost, 159.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 168.

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<sup>18</sup> Norman Gelb, *Ike and Monty: Generals at War* (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 362.

<sup>19</sup> Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect 1890-1952* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 350.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Martin Middlebrook, *Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle 17-26 September* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 65.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>23</sup> Gelb, 362.

<sup>24</sup> R.E. Urquhart, *Arnhem* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1958), 5.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 22.

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